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Abstract
This paper presents a computational model of how conversational participants collaborate in
order to make a referring action successful. The model is based on the view of language as goal-
directed behavior. We propose that the content of a referring expression can be accounted for
by the planning paradigm. Not only does this approach allow the processes of building referring
expressions and identifying their referents to be captured by plan construction and plan inference,
it also allows us to account for how participants clarify a referring expression by using meta-
actions that reason about and manipulate the plan derivation that corresponds to the referring
expression. To account for how clarification goals arise and how inferred clarification plans affect
the agent, we propose that the agents are in a certain state of mind, and that this state includes an
intention to achieve the goal of referring and a plan that the agents are currently considering. It
is this mental state that sanctions the adoption of goals and the acceptance of inferred plans, and
so acts as a link between understanding and generation.
∗To appear in Computational Linguistics, Volume 21-3, 1995
†This research was began at the Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, in the first author’s MSc thesis
under the supervision of the second author.
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1 Introduction
People are goal oriented and can plan courses of actions to achieve their goals. But sometimes they
might lack the knowledge needed to formulate a plan of action, or some of the actions that they
planmight depend on coordinating their activity with other agents. How do they cope? One way is
to work together, or collaborate, in formulating a plan of action with other people who are involved
in the actions or who know the relevant information.
Even in the apparently simple linguistic task of referring, in an utterance, to some object or idea
can involve exactly this kind of activity: a collaboration between the speaker and the hearer. The
speaker has the goal of the hearer identifying the object that the speaker has in mind. The speaker
attempts to achieve this goal by constructing a description of the object that she thinks will enable
the hearer to identify it. But since the speaker and the hearer will inevitably have different beliefs
about the world, the hearer might not be able to identify the object. Often, when the hearer cannot
do so, the speaker and hearer collaborate in making a new referring expression that accomplishes
the goal.
This paper presents a computational model of how a conversational participant collaborates in
making a referring action successful. We use as our basis the model proposed by Clark andWilkes-
Gibbs (1986), which gives a descriptive account of the conversational moves that participants make
when collaborating upon a referring expression. We cast their work into a model based on the
planning paradigm.
We propose that referring expressions can be represented by plan derivations, and that plan
construction and plan inference can be used to generate and understand them. Not only does this
approach allow the processes of building referring expressions and identifying their referents to be
captured in the planning paradigm, it also allows us to use the planning paradigm to account for
how participants clarify a referring expression. In this case, we use meta-actions that encode how a
plan derivation corresponding to a referring expression can be reasoned about and manipulated.
To complete the picture, we also need to account for the fact that the conversants are collaborat-
ing. We propose that the agents are in a mental state that includes not only an intention to achieve
the goal of the collaborative activity but also a plan that the participants are currently considering.
In the case of referring, this will be the plan derivation that corresponds to the referring expression.
This plan is in the common ground of the participants, and we propose rules that are sanctioned by
the mental state both for accepting plans that clarify the current plan, and for adopting goals to do
likewise. The acceptance of a clarification results in the current plan being updated. So, it is these
rules that specify how plan inference and plan construction affect and are affected by the mental
state of the agent. Thus, the mental state, together with the rules, provides the link between these
two processes. An important consequence of our proposal is that the current plan need not allow
the successful achievement of the goal. Likewise, the clarifications that agents propose need not
result in a successful plan in order for them to be accepted.
As can be seen, our approach consists of two tiers. The first tier is the planning component,
which accounts for how utterances are both understood and generated. Using the planning paradigm
has several advantages: it allows both tasks to be captured in a single paradigm that is used for
modeling general intelligent behavior; it allows more of the content of an utterance to be accounted
for by a uniform process; and only a single knowledge source for referring expressions is needed
instead of having this knowledge embedded in special algorithms for each task. The second tier
accounts for the collaborative behavior of the agents: how they adopt goals and coordinate their
activity. It provides the link between the mental state of the agent and the planning processes.
In accounting for how agents collaborate in making a referring action, our work aims to make
the following contributions to the field. First, although much work has been done on how agents
request clarifications, or respond to such requests, little attention has been paid to the collaborative
aspects of clarification discourse. Our work attempts a plan-based formalization of what linguistic
collaboration is, both in terms of the goals and intentions that underlie it and the surface speech acts
that result from it. Second, we address the act of referring and show how it can be better accounted
for by the planning paradigm. Third, previous plan-based linguistic research has concentrated on
either construction or understanding of utterances, but not both. By doing both, we will give our
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work generality in the direction of a complete model of the collaborative process. Finally, by using
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s model as a basis for our work, we aim not only to add support to their
model, but gain a much richer understanding of the subject.
In order to address the problem that we have set out, we have limited the scope of our work.
First, we look at referring expressions in isolation, rather than as part of a larger speech act. Second,
we assume that agents have mutual knowledge of the mechanisms of referring expressions and
collaboration. Third, we deal with objects that both the speaker and hearer know of, though they
might have different beliefs about what propositions hold for these objects. Fourth, as the input and
the output to our system, we use representations of surface speech actions, not natural language
strings. Finally, although belief revision is an important part of how agents collaborate, we do not
explicitly address this.
2 Referring as a Collaborative Process
Clark andWilkes-Gibbs (1986) investigated how participants in a conversation collaborate in mak-
ing a referring action successful. They conducted experiments in which participants had to refer to
objects—tangram patterns—that are difficult to describe. They found that typically the participant
trying to describe a tangram pattern would present an initial referring expression. The other partic-
ipant would then pass judgment on it, either accepting it, rejecting it, or postponing his decision. If it
was rejected or the decision postponed, then one participant or the other would refashion the refer-
ring expression. This would take the form of either repairing the expression by correcting speech
errors, expanding it by adding further qualifications, or replacing the original expression with a new
expression. The referring expression that results from this is then judged, and the process continues
until the referring expression is acceptable enough to the participants for current purposes. This
final expression is contributed to the participants’ common ground.
Below are two excerpts from Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s experiments that illustrate the accep-
tance process.
(2.1) A: 1 Um, third one is the guy reading with, holding his book to the left.
B: 2 Okay, kind of standing up?
A: 3 Yeah.
B: 4 Okay.
In this dialogue, person A makes an initial presentation in line 1. Person B postpones his decision
in line 2 by voicing a tentative “okay”, and then proceeds to refashion the referring expression, the
result being “the guy reading, holding his book to the left, kind of standing up.” A accepts the new
expression in line 3, and B signals his acceptance in line 4.
(2.2) A: 1 Okay, and the next one is the person that looks like they’re carrying
something and it’s sticking out to the left. It looks like a hat that’s
upside down.
B: 2 The guy that’s pointing to the left again?
A: 3 Yeah, pointing to the left, that’s it! (laughs)
B: 4 Okay.
In the second dialogue, B implicitly rejects A’s initial presentation by replacing it with a new refer-
ring expression in line 2, “the guy that’s pointing to the left again.” A then accepts the refashioned
referring expression in line 3.
Below, we give an algorithmic interpretation of Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s collaborative model,
where present, judge, and refashion are the conversational moves that the participants make, and
ref , re, and judgment are variables that represent the referent, the current referring expression, and
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its judgment, respectively. (Since the conversational moves update the referring expression and its
judgment, they are presented as functions.)
re = present(ref )
judgment = judge(ref,re)
while (judgment 6= accept)
re = refashion(ref,re)
judgment = judge(ref,re)
end-while
The algorithm illustrates how the collaborative activity progresses by the participants judging and
refashioning the previously proposed referring expression.1 In fact, we can see that the state of the
process is characterized by the current referring expression, re, and the judgment of it, judgment,
and that this state must be part of the common ground of the participants. The algorithm also
illustrates how the model of Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs minimizes the distinction between the roles
of the person who initiated the referring expression and the person who is trying to identify it.
Both have the same moves available to them, for either can judge the description and either can
refashion it. Neither is controlling the dialogue, they are simply collaborating.
In later work, Clark and Schaefer (1989) propose that “each part of the acceptance phase is itself
a contribution” (p. 269), and the acceptance of these contributions depends on whether the hearer
“believes he is understanding well enough for current purposes” (p. 267). Although Clark and
Schaefer use the term contribution with respect to the discourse, rather than the collaborative effort
of referring, their proposal is still relevant here: judgments and refashionings are contributions to
the collaborative effort and are subjected to an acceptance process, with the result being that once
they are accepted, the state of the collaborative activity is updated. So, what constitutes grounds
for accepting a judgment or clarification? In order to be consistent with Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’
model, we can see that if one agent finds the current referring expression problematic, the other
must accept that judgment. Likewise, if one agent proposes a referring expression, through a re-
fashioning, the other must accept the refashioning.
3 Referring Expressions
3.1 Planning and Referring
By viewing language as action, the planning paradigm can be applied to natural language process-
ing. The actions in this case are speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), and include such things
as promising, informing, and requesting. Cohen and Perrault (1979) developed a system that uses
plan construction to map an agent’s goals to speech acts, and Allen and Perrault (1980) use plan
inference to understand an agent’s plan from its speech acts. By viewing it as action (Searle, 1969),
referring can be incorporated into a planning model. Cohen’s model (1981) planned requests that
the hearer identify a referent, whereas Appelt (1985) planned concept activations, a generalization of
referring actions.
Although acts of reference have been incorporated into plan-based models, determining the
content of referring expressions hasn’t been. For instance, in Appelt’s model, concept activations
can be achieved by the action describe , which is a primitive, not further decomposed. Rather, this
action has an associated procedure that determines a description that satisfies the preconditions
of describe . Such special procedures have been the mainstay for accounting for the content of
referring expressions, both in constructing and in understanding them, as exemplified by Dale
(1989), who chose descriptors on the basis of their discriminatory power, Ehud Reiter (1990), who
focused on avoiding misleading conversational implicatures when generating descriptions, and
Mellish (1985), who used a constraint satisfaction algorithm to identify referents.
1For simplicity, we have not shown the change in speakers between refashionings and judgments.
5
Our work follows the plan-based approach to language generation and understanding. We ex-
tend the earlier approaches of Cohen and Appelt by accounting for the content of the description at
the planning level. This is done by having surface speech actions for each component of a descrip-
tion, plus a surface speech action that expresses a speaker’s intention to refer. A referring action
is composed of these primitive actions, and the speaker utters them in her attempt to refer to an
object.
These speech actions are the building blocks that referring expressions are made from. Acting
as the mortar are intermediate actions, which have constraints that the plan construction and plan
inference processes can reason about. These constraints encode the knowledge of how a description
can allow a hearer to identify an object. First, the constraints express the conditions under which an
attribute can be used to refer to an object; for instance, that it be mutually believed that the object
has a certain property (Clark and Marshall, 1981; Perrault and Cohen, 1981; Nadathur and Joshi,
1983). Second, the constraints keep track of which objects could be believed to be the referent of the
referring expression. Third, the constraints ensure that a sufficient number of surface speech actions
are added so that the set of candidates associated with the entire referring expression consists of
only a single object, the referent. These constraints enable the speaker to construct a referring
expression that she believes will allow the hearer to identify the referent. As for the hearer, the
explicit encoding of the adequacy of referring expressions allows referent identification to fall out
of the plan inference process.
Our approach to treating referring as a plan in which surface speech actions correspond to
the components of the description allows us to capture how participants collaborate in building
a referring expression. Plan repair techniques can be used to refashion an expression if it is not
adequate, and clarifications can refer to the part of the plan derivation that is in question or is being
repaired. Thus we can model a collaborative dialogue in terms of the changes that are being made
to the plan derivation.
The referring expression plans that we propose are not simply data structures, but are mental
objects that agents have beliefs about (Pollack, 1990). The plan derivation expresses beliefs of the
speaker: how actions contribute to the achievement of the goal, and what constraints hold that
will allow successful identification.2 So plan construction reasons about the beliefs of the agent in
constructing a referring plan; likewise, plan inference, after hypothesizing a plan that is consistent
with the observed actions, reasons about the other participant’s (believed) beliefs in satisfying the
constraints of the plan. If the hearer is able to satisfy the constraints, then he will have understood
the plan and be able to identify the referent, since a term corresponding to it would have been
instantiated in the inferred plan. Otherwise, there will be an action that includes a constraint that
is unsatisfiable, and the hearer construes the action as being in error. (We do not reason about how
the error affects the satisfiability of the goal of the plan nor use the error to revise the beliefs of the
hearer.)
3.2 Vocabulary and Notation
Before we present the action schemas for referring expressions, we need to introduce the notation
that we use. Our terminology for planning follows the general literature.3 We use the terms action
schema, plan derivation, plan construction, and plan inference. An action schema consists of a header,
constraints, a decomposition, and an effect; and it encodes the constraints under which an effect can
be achieved by performing the steps in the decomposition. A plan derivation is an instance of an
action that has been recursively expanded into primitive actions—its yield. Each component in the
plan—the action headers, constraints, steps, and effects—are referred to as nodes of the plan, and are
given names so as to distinguish two nodes that have the same content. Finally, plan construction is
the process of finding a plan derivation whose yield will achieve a given effect, and plan inference
is the process of finding a plan derivation whose yield is a set of observed primitive actions.
2Since we assume that the agents have mutual knowledge of the action schemas and that agents can execute surface
speech actions, we do not consider beliefs about generation or about the executability of primitive actions.
3See the introductory chapter of Allen, Hendler, and Tate (1990) for an overview of planning.
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The action schemas make use of a number of predicates and these are defined in Table 1. We
adopt the Prolog convention that variables begin with an upper-case letter, and all predicates and
constants begin with a lower-case letter. Two constants that need to be mentioned are system and
user. The first denotes the agent that we are modeling, and the latter, her conversational partner.
Since the action schemas are used for both constructing the plans of the system, and inferring the
plans of the user, it is sometimes necessary to refer to the speaker or hearer in a general way. For
this we use the propositions speaker(Speaker) and hearer(Hearer) . These instantiate the variables
Speaker and Hearer to system or user; which is which depends on whether the rule is being used
for plan construction or plan inference. These propositions are included as constraints in the action
schemas as needed.
3.3 Action Schemas
This section presents action schemas for referring expressions. (We omit discussion of actions that
account for superlative adjectives, such as “largest”, that describe an object relative to the set of
objects that match the rest of the description. A full presentation is given by Heeman (1991).)
As we mentioned, the action for referring, called refer, is mapped to the surface speech actions
through the use of intermediate actions and plan decomposition. All of the reasoning is done in
the refer action and the intermediate actions, so no constraints or effects are included in the surface
speech actions.
We use three surface speech actions. The first is s-refer(Entity) , which is used to express the
speaker’s intention to refer. The second is s-attrib(Entity,Predicate) , and is used for describing
an object in terms of an attribute; Entity is the discourse entity of the object, and Predicate is a
lambda expression, such as λX·category(X,bird) , that encodes the attribute. The third is s-attrib-
rel(Entity,OtherEntity,Predicate) , and is used for describing an object in terms of some other object.
In this case Predicate is a lambda expression of two variables, one corresponding to Entity, and the
other to OtherEntity; for instance, λX·λY· in(X,Y) .
Refer Action
The schema for refer is shown in Figure 1. The refer action decomposes into two steps: s-refer,
which expresses the speaker’s intention to refer, and describe , which accounts for the content of
the referring expression (given next). The effect of refer is that the hearer should believe that the
speaker has a goal of the hearer knowing the referent of the referring expression. The effect has
been formulated in this way because we are assuming that when a speaker has a communicative
goal she plans to achieve the goal by making the hearer recognize it; the effect will be achieved by
the hearer inferring the speaker’s plan, regardless of whether or not the hearer is able to determine
the actual referent. To simplify our implementation, this is the only effect that is stated for the action
schemas for referring expressions. It corresponds to the literal goal that Appelt and Kronfeld (1987)
propose (whereas the actual identification is their condition of satisfaction).
Header: refer(Entity,Object)
Constraint: knowref(Speaker,Speaker,Entity,Object)
Decomposition: s-refer(Entity)
describe(Entity,Object)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,knowref(Hearer,Speaker,Entity,Object)))
Figure 1: refer schema
7
Belief
bel(Agt,Prop) : Agt believes that Prop is true.
bmb(Agt1,Agt2,Prop) : Agt1 believes that it is mutually believed between himself and Agt2 that
Prop is true.
knowref(Agt1,Agt2,Ent,Obj) : Agt1 knows the referent that Agt2 associates with the discourse en-
tity Ent (Webber, 1983), which Agt1 believes to be Obj . (Proving this proposition with Ent
unbound will cause a unique identifier to be created for Ent .)
Goals and Plans
goal(Agt,Goal) : Agt has the goal Goal . Agents act to make their goals true.
plan(Agt,Plan,Goal) : Agt has the goal of Goal and has adopted the plan derivation Plan as a
means to achieve it. The agent believes that each action of Plan contributes to the goal, but
not necessarily that all of the constraints hold; in order words, the plan must be coherent but
not necessarily valid (Pollack, 1990, p. 94).
content(Plan,Node,Content) : The node named byNode in Plan has content Content .
yield(Plan,Node,Actions) : The subplan rooted atNode in Plan has a yield of the primitive actions
Actions.
achieve(Plan,Goal) : Executing Plan will cause Goal to be true.
error(Plan,Node) : Plan has an error at the action labeledNode . Errors are attributed to the action
that contains the failed constraint. This predicate is used to encode an agent’s belief about an
invalidity in a plan.
Plan Repair
substitute(Plan,Node,NewAction,NewPlan) : Undo all variable bindings in Plan (except those in
primitive actions, and then substitute the action header NewAction into Plan at Node , re-
sulting in the partial planNewPlan.
replan(Plan,Actions) : Complete the partial plan Plan. Actions are the primitive actions that are
added to the plan.
replace(Plan,NewPlan) : The planNewPlan replaces Plan.
Miscellaneous
subset(Set,Lambda,Subset) : Compute the subset, Subset , of Set that satisfies the lambda expres-
sion Lambda .
modifier-absolute-pred(Pred) : Pred is a predicate that an object can be described in terms of. Used
by themodifier-absolute schema given in Figure 6.
modifier-relative-pred(Pred) : Pred is a predicate that describes the relationship between two ob-
jects. Used by themodifier-relative schema given in Figure 7.
pick-one(Object,Set) : Pick one object, Object , of the members of Set .
speaker(Agt) : Agt is the current speaker.
hearer(Agt) : Agt is the current hearer.
Table 1: Predicates and Actions
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Intermediate Actions
The describe action, shown in Figure 2, is used to construct a description of the object through its
decomposition into headnoun and modifiers. The variable Cand is the candidate set, the set of
potential referents, associated with the head noun that is chosen, and it is passed to the modifiers
action so that it can ensure that the rest of the description rules out all of the alternatives.
Header: describe(Entity,Object)
Decomposition: headnoun(Entity,Object,Cand)
modifiers(Entity,Object,Cand)
Figure 2: describe schema
The action headnoun, shown in Figure 3, has a single step, s-attrib , which is the surface speech
action used to describe an object in terms of some predicate, which for the headnoun schema, is
restricted to the category of the object.4 The schema also has two constraints. The first ensures
that the referent is of the chosen category and the second determines the candidate set, Cand ,
associated with the head noun that is chosen. The candidate set is computed by finding the subset
of the objects in the world that the speaker believes could be referred to by the head noun—the
objects that the speaker and hearer have an appropriate mutual belief about.
Header: headnoun(Entity,Object,Cand)
Constraint: world(World)
bmb(Speaker,Hearer,category(Object,Category))
subset(World,λX·bmb(Speaker,Hearer,category(X,Category)),Cand)
Decomposition: s-attrib(Entity,λX·category(X,Category))
Figure 3: headnoun schema
The modifiers action attempts to ensure that the referring expression that is being constructed
is believed by the speaker to allow the hearer to uniquely identify the referent. We have defined
modifiers as a recursive action, with two schemas.5 The first schema, shown in Figure 4, is used
to terminate the recursion, and its constraint specifies that only one object can be in the candidate
set.6 The second schema, shown in Figure 5, embodies the recursion. It uses the modifier plan,
which adds a component to the description and updates the candidate set by computing the subset
of it that satisfies the new component. Themodifier plan thus accounts for individual components
of the description.
Header: modifiers-terminate(Entity,Object,Cand)
Constraint: Cand = [Object]
Decomposition: null
Figure 4: modifiers schema for terminating the recursion
There are two different action schemas for modifier; one is for absolute modifiers, such as
“black” and the other is for relative modifiers, such as “larger”. The former is shown in Figure 6;
it decomposes into the surface speech action s-attrib and has a constraint that determines the new
4Note that several category predications might be true of an object, and we do not explore which would be best to use,
but see Edmonds (1994) for how preferences can be encoded.
5We use specialization axioms (Kautz and Allen, 1986) to map the modifiers action to the two schemas: modifiers-
terminate andmodifiers-recurse .
6In order to distinguish this action from the primitive actions, it has a step that is marked null .
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Header: modifiers-recurse(Entity,Object,Cand)
Decomposition: modifier(Entity,Object,Cand,NewCand)
modifiers(Entity,Object,NewCand)
Figure 5: modifiers schema for recursing
candidate set,NewCand , by including only the objects from the old candidate set, Cand , for which
the predicate could be believed to be true. The other schema is shown in Figure 7 and is used for
describing objects in terms of some other object. It uses the surface speech action s-attrib-rel and
also includes a step to refer to the object of comparison.
Header: modifier-absolute(Entity,Object,Cand,NewCand)
Constraint: modifier-pred(Pred)
bmb(Speaker,Hearer,Pred(X))
subset(Cand,λX·bmb(Speaker,Hearer,Pred(X)),NewCand)
Decomposition: s-attrib(Entity,Pred)
Figure 6: modifier schema for absolute modifiers
Header: modifier-relative(Entity,Object,Cand,NewCand)
Constraint: modifier-rel-pred(Pred)
bmb(Speaker,Hearer,Pred(Object,OtherObject))
subset(Cand,λX·bmb(Speaker,Hearer,Pred(X)(Other)),NewCand) v
Decomposition: s-attrib-rel(Entity,OtherEntity,Pred)
refer(OtherEntity,Other)
Figure 7: modifier schema for relative modifiers
3.4 Plan Construction and Plan Inference
The goals that we are interested in achieving are communicative goals. Since these goals cannot
be directly achieved by a plan of action, the speaker must instead plan actions that will achieve
them indirectly, for instance by planning an utterance that results in the hearer recognizing her
goal. So, if the speaker wants to achieve Goal , she will attempt to construct a plan whose effect is
bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,Goal)) .
Plan Construction
Given an effect, the plan constructor finds a plan derivation that has a minimal number of primitive
action, that is valid (with respect to the planning agent’s beliefs), and whose root action achieves
the effect. The plan constructor uses a best-first search strategy, expanding the derivation with the
fewest number of surface speech actions. The yield of this plan derivation can then be given as
input to a module that generates the surface form of the utterance.
Plan Inference
Following Pollack (1990), our plan inference process can infer plans in which, in the hearer’s view,
a constraint does not hold. In inferring a plan derivation, we first find the set of plan derivations
that account for the primitive actions that were observed, without regard to whether the constraints
10
hold. This is done by using a chart parser that parses actions rather thanwords (Sidner, 1985; Vilain,
1990). For referring plans that contain more than one modifier, there will be multiple derivations
corresponding to the order of the modifiers. We avoid this ambiguity by choosing an arbitrary
ordering of the modifiers for each such plan.
In the second part of the plan inference process, we evaluate each derivation by attempting to
find an instantiation for the variables such that all of the constraints hold with respect to the hearer’s
beliefs about the speaker’s beliefs. It could however be the case that there is no instantiation, either
because this is not the right derivation or because the plan is based on beliefs not shared by the
speaker and the hearer. In the latter case, we need to determine which action in the plan is to
blame, so that this knowledge can be shared with the other participant.
After each derivation has been evaluated, if there is just one valid derivation, an instantiated
derivation whose constraints all hold, then the hearer will believe that he has understood. If there
is just one derivation and it is invalid, the action containing the constraint that is the source of the
invalidity is noted. (We have not explored ambiguous situations, those in which more than one
valid derivation remains, or, in the absence of validity, more than one invalid derivation.)
We now need to address how we evaluate a derivation. In the case where the plan is invalid,
we need to partially evaluate the plan in order to determine which action contains a constraint
that cannot be satisfied. However, any instantiation will lead to some constraint being found not
to hold. Care must therefore be taken in finding the right instantiation so that blame is attributed
to the action at fault. So, we evaluate the constraints in order of mention in the derivation, but
postpone any constraints that havemultiple solutions until the end. We have found that this simple
approach can find the instantiation for valid plans and can find the action that is in error for the
others.
To illustrate this, consider the headnoun action, which has the following constraints.
speaker(Speaker)
hearer(Hearer)
world(World)
bmb(Speaker,Header,category(Object,Category))
subset(World,λX·bmb(Speaker,Hearer,category(X,Category)),Cand)
During the first step, finding the derivation, all co-referential variables will be unified. In particu-
lar, the variable Category will be instantiated from the co-referential variable in the surface speech
action. The first three constraints have only a single solution, so they are instantiated. The fourth
constraint contains Object . If there is exactly one object that the system believes to be mutually
believed to be of Category, then Object is instantiated to it. If there is none, then this constraint
is unsatisfiable, and so the evaluation of this plan stops with this action marked as being in error,
since no object matches this part of the description. If there is more than one, then this constraint is
postponed and the evaluator moves on to the subset constraint. This constraint has one uninstan-
tiated variable, Cand , which has a unique (non-null) solution, namely the candidate set associated
with the head noun. So, this constraint is evaluated.
The evaluation then proceeds through the actions in the rest of the plan. Assuming that no
intervening errors are encountered, the evaluator will eventually reach the constraint on the termi-
nating instance of modifiers, Cand = [Object] , with Cand instantiated to a non-null set. If Cand
contains more than one object, then this constraint will fail, pinning the blame on the terminating
instance of modifiers for there not being enough descriptors to allow the referent to be identified.
Otherwise, the terminating constraint will be satisfiable, and so Object will be instantiated to the
single object in the candidate set. This will then allow all of the mutual belief constraints that were
postponed to be evaluated, since they will now have only a single solution.
4 Clarifications
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4.1 Planning and Clarifying
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) have presented a model of how conversational participants collab-
orate in making a referring action successful (see section 2 above). Their model consists of conver-
sational moves that express a judgment of a referring expression and conversational moves that
refashion an expression. However, their model is not computational. They do not account for how
the judgment is made, how the judgment affects the refashioning, nor the content of the moves.
Following the work of Litman and Allen (1987) in understanding clarification subdialogues,
we formalize the conversational moves of Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs as discourse actions. These
discourse actions are meta-actions that take as a parameter a referring expression plan. The con-
straints and decompositions of the discourse actions encode the conditions under which they can
be applied, how the referring expression derivations can be refashioned, and how the speaker’s
beliefs can be communicated to the hearer. So, the conversational moves, or clarifications, can be
generated and understood within the planning paradigm.7
Surface Speech Actions
An important part of our model is the surface speech actions. These actions serve as the basis for
communication between the two agents, and so they must convey the information that is dictated
by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s model. For the judgment plans, we have the surface speech actions s-
accept , s-reject , and s-postpone corresponding to the three possibilities in their model. These take
as a parameter the plan that is being judged, and for s-reject , also a subset of the speech actions
of the referring expression plan. The purpose of this subset is to inform the hearer of the surface
speech actions that the speaker found problematic. So, if the referring expression was “the weird
creature”, and the hearer couldn’t identify anything that he thought “weird”, he might say “what
weird thing”, thus indicating he had problems with the surface speech action corresponding to
“weird”.
For the refashioning plans, we propose that there is a single surface speech action, s-actions,
that is used for both replacing a part of a plan, and expanding it. This action takes as a parameter
the plan that is being refashioned, and a set of surface speech actions that the speaker wants to
incorporate into the referring expression plan. Since there is only one action, if is in uttered in
isolation, it will be ambiguous between a replacement and an expansion; however, the speech
action resulting from the judgment will provide the proper context to disambiguate its meaning.
In fact, during linguistic realization, if the two actions are being uttered by the same person, they
could be combined into a single utterance. For instance, the utterance “no, the red one” could
be interpreted as a s-reject of the color that was previously used to describe something and an
s-actions for the color “red.”
So, as we can see, the surface speech actions for clarifications operate on components of the plan
that is being built, namely the surface speech actions of referring expression plans. This is consis-
tent with our use of plan derivations to represent utterances. Although we could have viewed the
clarification speech actions as acts of informing (Litman and Allen, 1987), this would have shifted
the complexity into the parameter of the inform and it is unclear whether anything would have
been gained. Instead, we feel that a parser with a model of the discourse and the context can deter-
mine the surface speech actions.8 Additionally, it should be easier for the generator to determine
an appropriate surface form.
Judgment Plans
The evaluation of the referring expression plan indicates whether the referring action was success-
ful or not. If it was successful, then the referent has been identified, and so a goal to communicate
this is input to the plan constructor. This goal would be achieved by an instance of accept-plan,
which decomposes into the surface speech action s-accept .
7We use the term clarification, since the conversational moves of judging and refashioning a referring expression can be
viewed as clarifying it.
8See Levelt (1989, Chapter 12) for how prosody and clue words can be used in determining the type of clarification.
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If the evaluation wasn’t successful, then the goal of communicating the error is given to the
plan constructor, where the error is simply represented by the node in the derivation that the eval-
uation failed at. There are two reasons why the evaluation could have failed, either no objects
match, or more than one matches. In the first case, the referring expression is overconstrained,
and the evaluation would have failed on an action that decomposes into surface speech actions. In
the second case, the referring expression is underconstrained, and so the evaluation would have
failed on the constraint that specifies the termination of the addition of modifiers. In our formal-
ization of the conversational moves, we have equated the first case to reject-plan and the second
case to postpone-plan, and their constraints test for the abovementioned conditions. The actions
reject-plan and postpone-plan decompose into the surface speech actions s-reject and s-postpone ,
respectively.
By observing the surface speech action corresponding to the judgment, the hearer, using plan
inference, should be able to derive the speaker’s judgment plan. If the judgment was reject-plan
or postpone-plan, then the evaluation of the judgment plan should enable the hearer to determine
the action in the referring plan that the speaker found problematic due to the constraints specified
in the action schemas. The identify of the action in error will provide context for the subsequent
refashioning of the referring expression.9
Refashioning Plans
If a conversant rejects a referring expression or postpones judgment on it, then either the speaker
or the hearer will refashion the expression in the context of the rejection or postponement. In
keeping with Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, we use two discourse plans for refashioning: replace-plan
and expand-plan. The first is used to replace some of the actions in the referring expression plan
with new ones, and the second is to add new actions. Replacements can be used if the referring
expression either overconstrains or underconstrains the choice of referent, while the expansion can
be used only if it underconstrains the choice. So, these plans can check for these conditions.
The decomposition of the refashioning plans encode how a new referring expression can be
constructed from the old one. This involves three tasks: first, a single candidate referent is cho-
sen; second, the referring expression is refashioned; and third, this is communicated to the hearer
by way of the action s-actions, which was already discussed.10 The first step involves choosing
a candidate. If the speaker of the refashioning is the agent who initiated the referring expression,
then this choice is obviously pre-determined. Otherwise, the speaker must choose the candidate.
Goodman (1985) has addressed this problem for the case of when the referring expression over-
constrains the choice of referent. He uses heuristics to relax the constraints of the description and
to pick one that nearly fits it. This problem is beyond the scope of this paper, and so we choose
one of the referents arbitrarily (but see Heeman (1991) for how a simplified version of Goodman’s
algorithm that relaxes only a single constraint can be incorporated into the planning paradigm).
The second step is to refashion the referring expression so that it identifies the candidate chosen
in the first step. This is done by using plan repair techniques (Hayes, 1975;Wilensky, 1981;Wilkens,
1985). Our technique is to remove the subplan rooted at the action in error and replan with another
action schema inserted in its place. This technique has been encoded into our refashioning plans,
and so can be used for both constructing repairs and inferring how another agent has repaired a
plan.
Now we consider the effect of these refashioning plans. As we mentioned in section 2, once
the refashioning plan is accepted, the common ground of the participants is updated with the new
referring expression. So, the effect of the refashioning plans is that the hearer will believe that the
speaker wants the new referring expression plan to replace the current one. Note that this effect
does not make any claims about whether the new expression will in fact enable the successful
9Another approach would be to use the identity of the action in error to revise the beliefs that the agent has attributed to
the other conversant and to use the revised beliefs in refashioning the plan. However, such reasoning is beyond the scope
of this work.
10Another approach would have been to separate the communicative task from the first two (Lambert and Carberry,
1991).
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identification of the referent. For if it did, and if the new referring expression were invalid, this
would imply that the refashioning plan was also invalid, which is contrary to Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs’s model of the acceptance process. So, the understanding of a refashioning does not depend
on the understanding of the new proposed referring expression, but only on its derivation.
4.2 Action Schemas
This section presents action schemas for clarifications. Each clarification action includes a surface
speech action in its decomposition. However, all reasoning is done at the level of the clarification
actions, and so the surface actions do not include any constraints or effects. The notation used in
the action schemas was given in Table 1 above.
accept-plan
The discourse action accept-plan, shown in Figure 8, is used by the speaker to establish the mutual
belief that a plan will achieve its goal. The constraints of the schema specify that the plan being
accepted achieves its goal and the decomposition is the surface speech action s-accept . The effect of
the schema is that the hearer will believe that the speaker has the goal that it be mutually believed
that the plan achieves its goal.
Header: accept-plan(Plan)
Constraint: bel(Speaker,achieve(Plan,Goal))
Decomposition: s-accept(Plan)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,bel(Speaker,
achieve(Plan,Goal)))))
Figure 8: accept-plan schema
reject-plan
The discourse action reject-plan, shown in Figure 9, is used by the speaker if the referring expres-
sion plan overconstrains the choice of referent. The speaker uses this schema in order to tell the
hearer that the plan is invalid and which action instance the evaluation failed in. The constraints
require that the error occurred in an action instance whose yield includes at least one primitive ac-
tion. The decomposition consists of s-reject , which takes as its parameter the surface speech actions
that are in the yield of the problematic action.
Header: reject-plan(Plan)
Constraint: bel(Speaker,error(Plan,ErrorNode))
yield(Plan,ErrorNode,Acts)
not(Acts = [])
Decomposition: s-reject(Plan,Acts)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,bel(System,
error(Plan,ErrorNode)))))
Figure 9: reject-plan schema
postpone-plan
The schema for postpone-plan, shown in Figure 10, is similar to reject-plan. However, it requires
that the error in the evaluation occurred in an action that does not decompose into any primitive ac-
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tions, which for referring expressions will be the instance ofmodifiers that terminates the addition
of modifiers.
Header: postpone-plan(Plan)
Constraint: bel(Speaker,error(Plan,ErrorNode))
yield(Plan,ErrorNode,Acts)
Acts = []
Decomposition: s-postpone(Plan,Acts)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,bel(Speaker,
error(Plan,ErrorNode)))))
Figure 10: postpone-plan schema
replace-plan
The replace-plan schema is used by the speaker to replace some of the primitive actions in a plan
with new actions. Because we need knowledge of the type of action where the error occurred in
order that we can refashion the invalid plan, the constraints of this schema are more specific than
those of the judgment plans. The schema that we give in Figure 11, for instance, is used to refashion
a referring expression plan in which the error occurred in an instance of amodifier action.11
Header: replace-plan(Plan)
Constraint: bel(Speaker,error(Plan,ErrorNode))
content(Plan,ErrorNode,ErrorContent)
ErrorContent = modifier(Entity,Object1,Cand,Cand1)
Decomposition: pick-one(Object,Cand)
Replacement = modifier(Entity,Object,Cand,Cand2)
substitute(Plan,Node,Replacement,NewPlan)
replan(NewPlan,Acts)
s-actions(Plan,Acts)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,bel(Hearer,bel(Speaker,
replace(Plan,NewPlan)))))
Figure 11: replace-plan schema
The decomposition of the schema specifies how a new referring expression plan can be built.12
The first step, pick-one(Object,Cand) , chooses one of the objects that matched the part of the de-
scription that preceded the error; if the speaker is not the initiator of the referring expression, then
this is an arbitrary choice. The second step specifies the header of the action schema that will be
used to replace the subplan that contained the error. The third step substitutes the replacement
into the referring expression plan, undoing all variable instantiations in the old plan. This results
in the partial planNewPlan. The fourth step calls the plan constructor to complete the partial plan.
Finally, the fifth step is the surface speech action s-actions, which is used to inform the hearer of
the surface speech actions that are being added to the referring expression plan.
11If the error occurred in an instance of headnoun , a different replace-plan schema would need to be used, one that for
instance relaxed the category that was used in describing the object (Goodman, 1985; Heeman, 1991).
12We refer to the steps in the decomposition that are not action headers as mental actions. They need to be proved, just like
constraints.
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expand-plan
The expand-plan schema, shown in Figure 12, is similar to the replace-plan schema shown in Fig-
ure 11. The difference is that instead of replacing one of the instances of modifier, it replaces the
terminal instance ofmodifiers by amodifiers subplan that distinguishes one of the objects from the
others that match, thus effecting an expansion of the surface speech actions. Even if the speaker
thought that the referring expression as it stands were adequate (since the candidate set Cand
contains only one member), she will construct a non-null expansion since the replacement is the
recursive version ofmodifiers.
Header: expand-plan(Plan)
Constraint: bel(Speaker,error(Plan,ErrorNode))
content(Plan,ErrorNode,ErrorContent)
ErrorContent = modifiers-terminate(Entity,Object1,Cand)
Decomposition: pick-one(Object,Cand)
Replacement = modifiers-recurse(Entity,Object,Cand)
substitute(Plan,ErrorNode,Replacement,NewPlan)
replan(NewPlan,Acts)
s-actions(Plan,Acts)
Effect: bel(Hearer,goal(Speaker,mb(Speaker,Hearer,
replace(Plan,NewPlan))))
Figure 12: expand-plan schema
4.3 Plan Construction and Plan Inference
The general plan construction and plan inference processes are essentially the same as those for
referring expressions. However, the plan inference process has been augmented so as to embody
the criteria for understanding that were outlined in Section 4.1. The inference of judgment plans
must be sensitive to the fact that such a plan includes the constraint that the speaker found the
judged plan to be in error even though the hearer might not believe it to be. So, the inference
process is allowed to assume that the speaker believes any constraint that the goal of the plan
implies.
In the case of a refashioning, the hearer might not view the proposed referring expression plan
as being sufficient for identifying the referent, but would nonetheless understand the refashioning.
So, the inference process requires only that the proposed referring expression be derived—so that
it can serve to replace the current plan—but not that it be acceptable. So, when a replan action is
part of a plan that is being evaluated, the success of this action depends only on whether the plan
that is its parameter can be derived, but not whether the derived plan is valid.13
5 Modeling Collaboration
In the last two sections, we discussed how initial referring expressions, judgments, and refashion-
ings can be generated and understood in our plan-based model. In this section, we show how plan
construction and plan inference fit into a complete model of how an agent collaborates in making
a referring action successful. Previous natural language systems that use plans to account for the
surface speech acts underlying an utterance (such as Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Allen and Perrault,
1980; Appelt, 1985; Litman and Allen, 1987) model only the recognition or only the construction of
an agent’s plans, and so do not address this issue.
13Another approach would be to have the plan inference process reason about the intended effects of the plan that it
is inferring in order to decide whether it should evaluate embedded plans and whether this evaluation should affect the
evaluation of the parent plan.
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In order to model an agent’s participation in a dialogue, we need to model how the mental state
of the agent changes as a result of the contributions that are made to the dialogue. The change in
mental state can be modeled by the beliefs and goals that a participant adopts. When a speaker
produces an utterance, as long as the hearer finds it coherent, he can add a belief that the speaker
has made the utterance to accomplish some communicative goal. The hearer might then adopt
some goal of his own in response to this, and make an utterance that he believes will achieve this
goal. Participants expect each other to act in this way. These social norms allow participants to add
to their common ground by adopting the inferences about an utterance as mutual beliefs.
To account for how conversants collaborate in dialogue, however, this co-operation is not strong
enough. Not only must participants form mutual beliefs about what was said, they must also
form mutual beliefs about the adequacy of the plan for the task they are collaborating upon. If
the plan is not adequate, then they must work together to refashion it. This level of co-operation
is due to what Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs refer to as a mutual responsibility, or what Searle (1990)
refers to as a we-intention. This allows the agents to interact so that neither assumes control of the
dialogue, thus allowing both to contribute to the best of their ability without being controlled or
impeded by the other. This is different from what Grosz and Sidner (1990) have called master-
servant dialogues, which occur in teacher-apprentice or information-seeking dialogues, in which
one of the participants is controlling the conversation (cf. Walker and Whittaker, 1990). Note that
the non-controlling agent may be helpful by anticipating obstacles in the plan (Allen and Perrault,
1980), but this is not the same as collaborating.
The mutual responsibility that the agents share not only concerns the goal they are trying to
achieve, but also the plan that they are currently considering. This plan serves to coordinate their
activity and so agents will have intentions to keep this plan in their common ground. The plan
might not be valid (unlike the shared plan of Grosz and Sidner (1990)), so the agents might not mu-
tually believe that each action contributes to the goal of the plan. Because of this, agents will have
a belief regarding the validity of the plan, and an intention that this belief be mutually believed.
The discourse plans that we described in the previous section can now be seen as plans that can
be used to further the collaborative activity. Judgment plans express beliefs about the success of
the current plan, and refashioning plans update it. So, the mental state of an agent sanctions the
adoption both of goals to express judgment and of goals to refashion. It also sanctions the adoption
of beliefs about the current plan.14 If it is mutually believed that one of the conversants believes
there is an error with the current plan, the other also adopts this belief. Likewise, if one of the
conversants proposes a replacement, the other accepts it. Since both conversants expect the other
to behave in this way, each judgment and refashioning, so long as they are understood, results in
the judgment or refashioning being mutually believed. Thus the current plan, through all of its
refashionings, remains in the common ground of the participants.
Below, we discuss the rules for updating the mental state after a contribution is made. We then
give rules that account for the collaborative process.15
5.1 Rules for Updating the Mental State
After a plan has been contributed to the conversation, by way of its surface speech actions, the
speaker and hearer update their beliefs to reflect the contribution that has been made. Both assume
that the hearer is observant, can derive a coherent plan (not necessarily valid), and can infer the
communicative goal, which is expressed by the effect of the top-level action in the plan. We capture
this by having the agent that we are modeling, the system, adopt the belief that it is mutually
believed that the speaker intends to achieve the goal by means of the plan.16
14The collaborative activity also sanctions discourse expectations that the other participant’s utterances will pertain to the
collaborative activity. We do not explicitly address this however.
15For simplicity, we represent the rules for entering into a collaborative activity, adopting beliefs, and adopting goals with
the same operator, ⇐=. For a more formal account, three different operators should be used.
16See Perrault (1990) for how these inferences can be drawn by using default rules.
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bmb(system,user,plan(Speaker,Plan,Goal))
The system will also add a belief about whether she believes the plan will achieve the goal, and if
not, the action that she believes to be in error. So, one of the following propositions will be adopted.
bel(system,achieve(Plan,Goal))
bel(system,error(Plan,Node))
After the above beliefs have been added, there are a number of inferences that the agents can
make and, in fact, can believe will be made by the other participant as well, and so these inferences
can be mutually believed. The first rule is that if it is mutually believed that the speaker intends to
achieve Goal by means of Plan, then it will be mutually believed that the speaker has Goal as one
of her goals.17
Rule 1
bmb(system,user,goal(Agt1,Goal))⇐=
bmb(system,user,plan(Agt1,Plan,Goal)) &
Agt1 ∈ {system,user}
The next rule concerns the adoption by the hearer of the intended goals of communicative acts.
The communicative goal that we are concerned with is where the speaker wants the hearer to be-
lieve that the speaker believes some proposition. This only requires that the hearer believe the
speaker to be sincere. We assume that both conversants are sincere, and so when such a commu-
nicative goal arises, both participants will assume that the hearer has adopted the goal. This is
captured by rule (2).
Rule 2
bmb(system,user,bel(Agt1,Prop))⇐=
bmb(system,user,goal(Agt1,bel(Agt2,bel(Agt1,Prop)))) &
Agt1,Agt2 ∈ {system,user} &
not(Agt1 = Agt2)
The last rule involves an inference that is not shared. When the user makes a contribution to a
conversation, the system assumes that the user believes that the plan will achieve its intended goal.
Rule 3
bel(system,bel(user,achieve(Plan,Goal)))⇐=
bmb(system,user,plan(user,Plan,Goal))
5.2 Rules for Updating the Collaborative State
The second set of rules that we give concern how the agents update the collaborative state. These
rules have been revised from an earlier version (Heeman, 1991) so as to better model the acceptance
process.
5.2.1 Entering into a Collaborative Activity
We need a rule that permits an agent to enter into a collaborative activity. We use the predicate
cstate to represent that an agent is in such a state, and this predicate takes as its parameters the
agents involved, the goal they are trying to achieve, and their current plan. Our view of when such
a collaborative activity can be entered is very simple: the system believes it is mutually believed
that one of them has a goal to refer and has a plan for doing so, but one of them believes this plan
to be in error. The last part of the condition states that if the speaker’s referring expression was suc-
cessful from the beginning, no collaboration is necessary. It is not required that both participants
17All variables mentioned in the rules are existentially quantified.
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mutually believe there is an error. Rather, if either detects an error, then that conversant can pre-
suppose that they are collaborating, andmake a judgment. Once the other recognizes the judgment
that the plan is in error, the criteria for him entering will be fulfilled for him as well.
Rule 4
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal)⇐=
bmb(system,user,goal(Agt1,Goal)) &
bmb(system,user,plan(Agt1,Plan,Goal)) &
Goal = knowref(Agt2,Agt1,Entity,Object) &
bel(system,bel(Agt3,error(Plan,Node))) &
Agt1,Agt2,Agt3∈ {system,user} &
not(Agt1 = Agt2)
5.2.2 Adoption of Mutual Beliefs
In order to model how the state of the collaborative activity progresses, we need to account for the
mutual beliefs that the agents adopt as a result of the utterances that are made.
The first rule is for judgment moves in which the speaker finds the current plan in error. Given
that the move is understood, both conversants, by way of the rules given in section 5.1, will believe
that it is mutually believed that the speaker believes the current plan to be in error. In this case,
the hearer, in the spirit of collaboration, must accept the judgment and so also adopt the belief that
the plan is in error, even if he initially found the plan adequate. Since both conversants expect the
hearer to behave in this way, the belief that there is an error can be mutually believed. Rule (5),
below, captures this. (The adoption of this belief will cause the retraction of any beliefs that the
plan is adequate.)
Rule 5
bmb(system,user,error(Plan,Node))⇐=
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bmb(system,user,bel(Agt1,error(Plan,Node))) &
Agt1 ∈ {system,user}
The second rule is for refashioning moves. After such a move, the conversants will believe it
mutually believed that the speaker has a replacement,NewPlan, for the current plan, Plan. Again,
in the spirit of collaboration, the hearer must accept this replacement, and since both expect each
other to behave this way, both adopt the belief that it is mutually believed that the new referring
expression plan replaces the old one.
Rule 6
bmb(system,user,replace(Plan,NewPlan))⇐=
Agt1 ∈ {system,user} &
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bmb(system,user,error(Plan,Node)) &
bmb(system,user,bel(Agt1,replace(Plan,NewPlan)))
In adopting this belief, the system updates the cstate by replacing the current plan with the new
plan, and adding beliefs that capture the utterance of NewPlan as outlined in section 5.1 above.
The third rule is for judgment moves in which the speaker finds the current plan acceptable.
Given that the move has been understood, each conversant will believe it is mutually believed
that the speaker believes that the current plan will achieve the goal (second condition of the rule).
However, in order to accept this move, each participant also needs to believe that the hearer also
finds the plan acceptable (third condition). This belief would have been inferred if it were the
hearer who had proposed the current plan, or the last refashioning. In this case, the speaker (of the
acceptance) would have inferred by way of rule (3) that the hearer believes the plan to be valid;
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as for the hearer, given that he contributed the current plan, he undoubtedly also believes it to be
acceptable.
Rule 7
bmb(system,user,achieve(Plan,Goal))⇐=
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bmb(system,user,bel(Agt1,achieve(Plan,Goal))) &
bel(system,bel(Agt2,achieve(Plan,Goal))) &
Agt1,Agt2 ∈ {system,user} &
not(Agt1 = Agt2)
5.2.3 Adopting Goals
The last set of rules complete the circle. They account for how agents adopt goals to further the
collaborative activity. These goals lead to judgment and refashioning moves, and so correspond to
the rules that we just gave for adopting mutual beliefs.
The first goal adoption rule is for informing the hearer that there is an error in the current plan.
The conditions specify that Plan is the current plan of a collaborative activity and that the speaker
believes that there is an error in it.
Rule 8
goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,error(Plan,Node))))⇐=
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bel(system,error(Plan,Node))
The second rule is used to adopt the goal of replacing the current plan, Plan, if it has an error.
The rule requires that the agent believe that it is mutually believed that there is an error in the
current plan. So, this goal cannot be adopted before the goal of expressing judgment has been
planned. Note that the consequent has an unbound variable,NewPlan. This variable will become
bound when the system develops a plan to achieve this goal, by using the action schema replace-
plan (Figure 11 above).
Rule 9
goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,replace(Plan,NewPlan))))⇐=
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bmb(system,user,error(Plan,Node))
The third rule is used to adopt the goal of communicating the system’s acceptance of the current
plan. Not only must the system believe that the plan achieves the goal, but it must also believe that
the user also believes this. As mentioned above for rule (7), this last condition prevents the system
from trying to accept a plan that it has itself just proposed. Rather, it can only try to accept a plan
that the other agent contributed, for it is just such plans for which it will have the belief, by way of
rule (3), that the user believes the plan achieves the goal.
Rule 10
goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,achieve(Plan,Goal))))⇐=
cstate(system,user,Plan,Goal) &
bel(system,achieve(Plan,Goal)) &
bel(system,bel(user,achieve(Plan,Goal)))
5.3 Applying the Rules
The rules that we have given are used to update the mental state of the agent and to guide its
activity. Acting as the hearer, the system performs plan inference on each set of actions that it
observes, and then applies any rules that it can. When all of the observed actions are processed, the
system switches from the role of hearer to speaker.
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As the speaker, the system checks whether there is a goal that it can try to achieve, and if so,
constructs a plan to achieve it. Next, presupposing its partner’s acceptance of the plan, it applies
any rules that it can. It repeats this until there are no more goals. The actions of the constructed
plans form the response of the system; in a complete natural language system, they would be
converted to a surface utterance. The system then switches to the role of hearer.
6 An Example
We are now ready to illustrate our system in action.18 For this example, we use a simplified version
of a subdialogue from the London-Lund corpus (Svartvik and Quirk, 1980, S.2.4a:1–8):
(6.1) A: 1 See the weird creature.
B: 2 In the corner?
A: 3 No, on the television.
B: 4 Okay.
The system will take the role of person B and we will give it the belief that there are two objects
that are “weird”—a television antenna, which is on the television, and a fern plant, which is in the
corner.
6.1 Understanding “The weird creature”
For the first sentence, the system is given as input the surface speech actions underlying “the weird
creature,” as shown below:
s-refer(entity1)
s-attrib(entity1,λX·assessment(X,weird))
s-attrib(entity1,λX·category(X,creature))
The system invokes the plan inference process, which finds the plan derivations whose yield is
the above set of surface speech actions. In this case, there is only one, and the system labels it p1 .
Figure 13 shows the derivation; arrows represent decomposition, and for brevity, constraints and
mental actions have been omitted and the parameters only of the surface speech actions are shown.
Next, the plan derivation is evaluated. The subset constraint in the headnoun action is eval-
uated, which narrows the candidate set to the antenna and the fern plant. The subset constraint
in the modifier action is then evaluated, which does not eliminate either of the candidates, since
the system finds both of them “weird.” The constraint on the modifiers action that terminates the
addition of modifiers is then evaluated. However, this constraint fails, since there are two objects
that match the description rather than one, as required.
The system then updates its beliefs. As described in section 5.1, the system adds the following
beliefs to capture the results of the plan inference process: that it is mutually believed that the user
has the goal of knowref and has adopted p1 as a means to achieve it, and that p1 has an error on
the terminating instance ofmodifiers, node p22 .
bmb(system,user,plan(user,p1,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object))) (11)
bel(system,error(p1,p22)) (12)
The system next tries to apply the belief and goal adoption rules. From rule (1) and belief (11), the
system adds the belief that it is mutually believed that the user has the goal that the system knowref
and from rule (3) and belief (11), it adds the belief that the user believes that the plan achieves its
goal.
18The system is implemented in C-Prolog under Unix.
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describes-refer(entity1)
headnoun
s-attrib(entity1,λX·category(X,creature))
modifiers-recurse
modifiers-terminate
null
modifier-absolute
s-attrib(entity1,λX·assessment(X,weird))
refer
Figure 13: Plan derivation (p1 ) for “The weird creature”
bmb(system,user,goal(user,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object))) (13)
bel(system,bel(user,achieve(p1,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object)))) (14)
Belief (13), along with (11) and (12), allows the system to apply rule (4), and so the system enters
into a collaborative activity, in which the goal is for it to know the referent and in which the current
plan is p1 .
cstate(system,user,p1,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object)) (15)
Since the system believes there is an error in the current plan, it applies rule (8), and so gives itself
the communicative goal of informing the user of the error in the current plan.
goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,error(p1,p22)))) (16)
6.2 Constructing “In the corner?”
Since there are no further belief or goal adoption rules that can be applied, the system next checks
for any goals that it can try to achieve. The only goal is (16), which is to inform the user of the
error in the plan. Since the error in the referring plan is in the terminating instance of modifiers,
the plan constructor builds an instance of postpone-plan, which it names p26 . (The schema was
given in Figure 10.) Rather than realizing the surface speech action immediately, the system plans
ahead. (This would allow an opportunistic process to combine surface speech actions into a single
utterance (Appelt, 1985).) So, the system, presupposing that the user understands the system’s
plan, adds the following belief.
bmb(user,system,plan(system,p26,bel(user,bel(system,error(p1,p22))))) (17)
It also adds the belief that this plan will achieve its goal.
bel(system,achieve(p26,bel(user,bel(system,error(p1,p22))))) (18)
Then by rule (1), the system adds the belief that it is mutually believed that it has the goal.
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bmb(system,user,goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,error(p1,p22))))) (19)
Then by rule (2), which captures the co-operativity of the agents in communicative goals, it adds
the belief that it is mutually believed that the system believes there is an error.
bmb(system,user,bel(system,error(p1,p22))) (20)
Then, on the basis of (15) and (20) the system applies rule (5), thus adopting the belief that it is
mutually believed that there is an error in the plan. This presupposes the user’s acceptance of the
judgment plan.
bmb(system,user,error(p1,p22)) (21)
The system is now able to apply rule (9), on the basis of (15) and (21), and so adopts the goal of
refashioning the invalid referring expression plan and of informing the user of the new plan.
goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,replace(p1,RPlan)))) (22)
Since no further rules can be applied, the system checks for goals that it can try to fulfill, which
will result in choosing (22). To achieve this goal, the plan constructor builds an instance of expand-
plan (previously shown in Figure 12). In doing this, the system chooses one of the objects that
matched the original description as the likely referent; in this case it happens to choose the object
in the corner, the fern plant, which the system represents as fern1 . It then substitutes themodifiers
subplan that terminates the addition of modifiers with the header of the modifiers-recurse action
(with the chosen object instantiated in). The plan constructor is then called to fill in the details,
thereby creating the expansion. The expansion it chooses includes a relative modifier (see Figure 7)
that describes the object as being in the corner. The new referring plan (labeled p34 ) is shown in
Figure 14, with the expansion circled (we have abbreviated the derivation of “the corner”). The
surface speech action of expand-plan is s-actions, which takes the surface speech actions of the
expansion, listed below, as its parameter.
s-attrib-rel(entity1,entity2,λX·λY· in(X,Y))
s-refer(entity2)
s-attrib(entity2,λX·category(X,corner))
Next, the system assumes the user will understand the refashioning, and, by way of rule (1) and
(2), will be cooperative and adopt the communicative goal that the system believes that the new
expanded plan replaces the old referring expression plan. The end result is given below as (23).
bmb(system,user,bel(system,replace(p1,p34))) (23)
The system, on the basis of (15) and (23), applies rule (6), and so assumes that the user will accept
the refashioning. So, the system adds the belief that it is mutually believed that the new expanded
plan replaces the old referring expression.
bmb(system,user,replace(p1,p34)) (24)
This causes the belief module to update the current plan of the collaborative activity (25). Also, it
adds the beliefs that capture the utterance of the refashioned plan: that the system intends it as a
means to achieve the referring action and that it does achieve this goal.19
19Even though the system has the referent incorrectly identified in the goal of knowref , the goal itself is still valid: for it
to identify the referent corresponding to entity1 .
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s-refer(entity1)
refer
headnoun
s-attrib(entity1,λX·category(X,creature))
describe
modifiers-recurse
modifier-absolute
s-attrib(entity1,λX·assessment(X,weird)) modifier-relative
s-attrib-rel(entity1,entity2,λX·λY· in(X,Y))
refer
“the corner”
null
modifiers-terminate
modifiers-recurse
Figure 14: Plan derivation (p34 ) for “The weird creature in the corner”
cstate(system,user,p34,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object))) (25)
bmb(system,user,plan(system,p34,knowref(system,user,entity1,fern1))) (26)
bel(system,achieve(p34,knowref(system,user,entity1,fern1))) (27)
The two plans that were constructed, postpone-plan and expand-plan, give rise to the output of
the surface speech actions s-postpone and s-expand , which would be realized as “in the corner?”.20
6.3 Understanding “No, on the television”
The user next utters “No, on the television.” This would get parsed into two separate surface speech
actions, an s-reject corresponding to “no”, and an s-actions corresponding to “on the television.”
For simplicity, the plan inference process is invoked separately on each.
The system starts with the s-reject action. We assume that the parser can determine from con-
text that the “no” is rejecting the surface speech actions that were previously added and so the
parameter of s-reject is a list of these actions. From this, it derives a plan whose yield is the s-reject
action, and this plan is an instance of reject-plan (previously shown in Figure 9). The system then
evaluates the constraints of the plan, which results in it determining which action in the plan the
user found to be in error. This is done by evaluating the constraints of reject-plan, and so find-
ing the action whose yield is the surface speech actions that were rejected. This will be p56 , the
modifiers-relative action that described the object as being in the corner. The resulting belief, after
applying rules (1) and (2), is the following.
bmb(system,user,bel(user,error(p34,p56))) (28)
The system then applies the appropriate acceptance rule, rule (5), and so adopts the belief that the
error is mutually believed.
20Although our model does not account for the questioning intonation, it could be a manifestation of the s-postpone .
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bmb(system,user,error(p34,p56)) (29)
With this belief, the system will have the context that it needs to understand the user’s refashioning
plan.
The system next performs plan recognition starting with the second surface speech action, s-
actions, which corresponds to the refashioning “on the television”. It takes as a parameter the
following list of actions:21
s-attrib-rel(entity1,entity3,λX·λY·on(X,Y))
s-refer(entity3)
s-attrib(entity3,λX·category(X,television))
The system finds two plan derivations that account for the primitive action, one an instance of
replace-plan (see Figure 11) and the other an instance of expand-plan (Figure 12). Next it evaluates
the constraints of each derivation. The constraints of expand-plan do not hold since the action in
error, p56 , is not an instance of modifiers-terminate , so this plan is eliminated. The constraints
(and mental actions) of replace-plan do hold, and so the system is able to derive the refashioned
referring plan, which it labels p104 .
Since this instance of replace-plan is the only valid derivation corresponding to the surface
speech actions observed, the system takes it as the plan behind the user’s utterance. As a result, the
system adds the following belief (after applying rule (1) and (2)).
bmb(system,user,bel(user,replace(p34,p104))) (30)
The system then applies the acceptance rule for refashioning plans, rule (6), and so adopts the
refashioning as mutually believed.
bmb(system,user,replace(p34,p104)) (31)
This causes the belief module to update the current plan of the collaborative activity and to add the
belief that the user contributed the new referring expression plan.
cstate(system,user,p104,knowref(system,user,entity1,Object)) (32)
bmb(system,user,plan(user,p104,knowref(system,user,entity1,antenna1)) (33)
The new referring plan will already have been evaluated. The subplan corresponding to “the tele-
vision” would have been understood without problem,22 and the modifier corresponding to “on
the television” would have narrowed down the candidates that matched “weird creature” to a sin-
gle object, antenna1 . So, the belief module adds the belief that the system finds the new referring
plan to be valid. Also, by way of rule (3), the system adds the belief that the user also does, since
the user had proposed it.
bel(system,achieve(p104,knowref(system,user,entity1,antenna1))) (34)
bel(system,bel(user,achieve(p104,knowref(system,user,entity1,antenna1)))) (35)
6.4 Constructing “Okay”
On the basis of (32), (34), and (35), the system is able to apply rule (10), and so adopts the goal of
accepting the plan.
21We assume that the parser determines the appropriate discourse entities in these actions: entity1 is the discourse entity
for the object being referred to, and entity3 is another discourse entity.
22If “the television” is not understood, then since it is a referring expression in its own right, the conversants could
collaborate on identifying its referent independently of the referent of “the weird creature”; that is, the participants could
enter into an embedded collaborative activity by focusing on one part of the current plan.
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goal(system,bel(user,bel(system,achieve(p104,
knowref(system,user,entity1,antenna1)))))) (36)
The plan constructor achieves this by planning an instance of accept-plan, which results in the
surface speech action s-accept , which would be realized as “Okay.” Then, after the application of
rules (1), (2), and most importantly (7), the system adopts the belief that it is mutually believed that
the plan achieves the goal of referring.
bmb(system,user,achieve(p104,knowref(system,user,entity1,antenna1))) (37)
7 Comparisons to Related Work
In providing a computational model of how agents collaborate upon referring expressions, we have
touched on several different areas of research. First, our work has built on previous work in refer-
ring expressions, especially their incorporation into a model based on the planning paradigm. Sec-
ond, our work has built on the research done in modeling clarifications in the planning paradigm
and on plan repair. Third, our work is related to the research being done on modeling collaborative
and joint activity.
7.1 Referring Expressions
Cohen (1981) and Appelt (1985) have also addressed the generation of referring expressions in the
planning paradigm. They have integrated this into a model of generating utterances, a step that
we haven’t taken. However, we have extended their model by incorporating even the generation
of the components of the description into our planning model. One result of this is that our surface
speech actions are much more fine-grained.
7.2 Clarifications and Plan Repair
An important part of our work involves accounting for clarifications of referring expressions by
using meta-actions that incorporate plan repair techniques. This approach is based on Litman and
Allen’s work (1987) on understanding clarification subdialogues, in which meta-actions were used
to model discourse relations, such as clarifications. There are several major differences between
our work and theirs. First, our work addresses not only understanding but also generation and
how these two tasks fit into a model of how agents collaborate in discourse. Second, Litman and
Allen use a stack of unchanging plans to represent the state of the discourse. We, however, use a
single current plan, modifying it as clarifications are made. This difference has an important ramifi-
cation, for it results in different interpretations of the discourse structure. Consider dialogue (7.1),
which was collected at an information booth in a Toronto train station (Horrigan, 1977). (Although
the participants are not collaborating in making a referring expression, the dialogue will serve to
illustrate our point.)
(7.1) P: 1 The 8:50 to Montreal?
C: 2 8:50 to Montreal. Gate 7.
P: 3 Where is it?
C: 4 Down this way to your left. Second one on the left.
P: 5 OK. Thank you.
Litman and Allen represent the state of the discourse after the second utterance as a clarification of
the passenger’s take-train-trip plan. The information that the train boards at gate 7 is represented
only in the clarification plan. So, when the passenger asks “Where is it?”, their system, acting as the
clerk, cannot interpret this as a clarification of the take-train-trip plan, since the utterance “cannot
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be seen as a step of [that] plan” (p. 188). So, it is interpreted instead as a request for a clarification
of the clerk’s “Gate 7” response, implicitly assuming that “Gate 7” was not accepted. In our model,
the acceptance of “Gate 7” would be presupposed, and so it would be incorporated into the take-
train-trip plan. So, the passenger’s question of “Where is it?” would be viewed as a request for the
clerk to clarify that plan.
The work of Moore and Swartout (1991), Cawsey (1991), and Carletta (1991) on interactive ex-
planations also addresses clarifications using plan repair techniques. This body of work uses plan
construction techniques to generate explanations, and uses the constructed plan as a basis for recov-
ery strategies if the user doesn’t understand the explanation. In the cases of Cawsey and Carletta,
both use meta-actions to encode the plan repair techniques. However, none of these approaches
are within a collaborative framework, in which either agent can contribute to the development of
the plan.
Other relevant work is that of Lambert and Carberry (1991). In their model of understanding
information-seeking dialogues, they propose a distinction between problem-solving activities and
discourse activities. In contrast, our clarifications embody both functions in the same actions, thus
allowing for a simpler approach to inferring the refashioned referring expressions, since we need
not chain to ameta-operator. In laterwork, Chu-Carroll and Carberry (1994) extended this model to
generate responses to proposals that are viewed as sub-optimal or invalid. Like Litman and Allen
(1987), they adopt the view that subsequent modifications apply to the preceding modification,
rather than the underlying plan.
7.3 Collaboration
Grosz, Sidner, and Lochbaum (Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Lochbaum, Grosz, and Sidner, 1990) are
interested in the type of plans that underlie discourse in which the agents are collaborating in order
to achieve some goal. They propose that agents are building a shared plan inwhich participants have
a collection of beliefs and intentions about the actions in the plan. Our model differs from theirs in
two important aspects. First, not only do agents have a collection of beliefs and intentions regarding
the actions of a shared plan, we feel that they also have an intention about the goal (Searle, 1990;
Cohen and Levesque, 1991). It is this intention, in conjunction with the current plan, that sanctions
the adoption of beliefs and intentions about potential actions that will contribute to the goal, rather
than just the shared plan.
Second, we feel that their definition of a partial shared plan is too restrictive. Although they
address partial plans, they require, in order for an action to be part of a partial shared plan, that both
agents believe that the action contributes to the goal. However, this is too strong. In collaborating
to achieve a mutual goal, participants sometimes propose an action that is not believed by the
other participant or even by the participant that is proposing it. In failing to represent such states,
their model is unable to represent the intermediate states in which a hearer might have understood
how the speaker’s utterance contributes to a plan, but doesn’t agree with it. This is important,
since if the refashioned plan is invalid, only the referring expression should be refashioned, not the
refashioning itself.
Traum (1991; Traum and Hinkelman, 1992) is concerned with providing a computational model
of grounding, the process in which conversational participants add to the common ground of a
conversation (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1990). Traum models the grounding
process by proposing that utterances move through a number of states, ‘pushed’ by grounding acts,
which include initiate, continue, repair, request repair, acknowledge, and request acknowledge.
Once an utterance has been acknowledged, it will reside inmutual belief as a proposal of the person
who initiated it. The proposal state is a subspace of the mutual belief space of the conversants. Only
once it has been accepted, will it be moved into the shared space (also in mutual belief). Unlike
Traum’s, our work does not differentiate the proposal state from the shared state. If a proposal is
understood, it is incorporated into the current plan. Judgments of acceptability are not on proposals
but on the current plan, or a part of it.
Sidner (1992) addressed the issue of how conversational participants collaborate in building a
shared plan. In this work, Sidner presents a number of speech actions for use in collaborative tasks.
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These actions are those that an artificial agent could use in negotiating which actions or beliefs to
accept into the shared plan of the agents. As with Traum, it is the proposals that are refashioned,
before they are integrated into the shared plan, rather than the shared plan.
Cohen and Levesque (1991) focus on formalizing joint intention in a logic. They use this for-
malism to explain how such elements of communication as confirmations arise when agents are
engaging in a joint action. However, they have not addressed how agents collaborate in building
a plan, only how agents collaborate while executing a plan. Once this limitation is overcome, their
approach could offer us a route for formalizing the mental states of the collaborating agents in our
model and for proving that our acceptance and goal adoption rules follow from such states.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a computational model of how a conversational participant collaborates inmak-
ing and understanding a referring expression, based on the view that language is goal-oriented be-
havior. This has allowed us to do the following. First, we have accounted for the tasks of building a
referring expression and identifying its referent by using plan construction and plan inference. Sec-
ond, we have accounted for the conversational moves that participants make during the acceptance
process by using meta-actions. Third, we have accounted for collaborative activity by proposing
that agents are in a certain mental state that includes a goal, a plan that they are currently consider-
ing, and intentions. This mental state sanctions the acceptance of clarification plans, and sanctions
the adoption of goals to clarify. Although our work has focused on referring expressions, we feel
that it is relevant to collaboration in general and to how agents contribute to discourse.
This paper is based on the model of collaboration proposed by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986).
Their model makes two strong claims about how agents collaborate. First, it minimizes the distinc-
tion between the roles of the person who initiates the referring expression and the person who is
trying to identify it. Both have the same moves available to them, for either can judge the descrip-
tion and either can refashion it. This allows both participants to contribute without being controlled
or impeded by the other. Second, their model gives special status to the role of the current referring
expression (current plan): participants judge and refashion the current referring expression directly,
rather than recursively modifying modifications (e.g. Litman and Allen, 1987; Chu-Carrol and Car-
berry, 1994) or incrementally adding to the current plan with each accepted proposal (e.g. Traum
and Hinkelman, 1992; Sidner, 1992). In our work, we have taken Clark andWilkes-Gibbs’s descrip-
tive model and recast it into a computational one, thus demonstrating the computational feasibility
of their work and its compatibility with current practices in artificial intelligence.
There are many ways that this research could be extended. Perhaps the most obvious would
be to extend the planning component of our model. First, our coverage of referring expressions
could be extended to handle references to objects in focus and to descriptions that include a plan
of physical actions for identifying the referent. Second, the treatment of clarifications could be
improved; specifically, how plan failures are reasoned about, how plan failures affect the agent’s
beliefs, and how these failures are repaired. Third, this research needs to be integrated into a more
complete plan-based approach to language, and needs to be extended so as to handle more general
discourse plan failures (McRoy and Hirst, 1993; McRoy and Hirst, 1994; Horton and Hirst, 1991;
Heeman, 1993; Edmonds, 1994; Hirst et al., 1994). A benchmark for such future work could be
dialogue (8.1) below, from the London-Lund corpus (Svartvik and Quirk, 1980, S.2.4a:1–8), which
is the basis of the example used in section 6. This dialogue shows how collaboration on a refer-
ring expression can be embedded in other activities, how agents can return back to a collaborative
activity, and even how agents can take advantage of a mistaken referent.
(8.1) A: 1 What’s that weird creature over there?
B: 2 In the corner?
A: 3 affirmative noise
B: 4 It’s just a fern plant.
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A: 5 No, the one to the left of it.
B: 6 That’s the television aerial. It pulls out.
A second avenue for future work is to further investigate collaborative behavior and protocols
for interaction. We need to formalize what it means for agents to be collaborating, in a theory that
takes account of rational interaction and the beliefs and knowledge of the participants. Such a
theory would do the following. First, it would give a more complete motivation for the processing
rules that we used for how agents interact in a collaborative activity. Second, it would account
for why agents would enter into such a mode of interaction, how it is initiated, how it is carried
forward (especially how agents’ beliefs and knowledge influence their actions), and how it ends.
Third, it would be extendable to other forms of interaction, such as information-seeking dialogues.
Fourth, it would specify how collaborative activity could be embedded in, or embed, other types
of interactions. By answering these questions, we will not only have a better model to base natural
language interfaces on, but we will also have a better understanding of how people interact.
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